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NOTE VERBALE DATED 19 JUNE 1992* FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ECUADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to inform him that the Government of Ecuador has duly taken the relevant administrative measures to ensure compliance, throughout Ecuador, with the obligations laid down in Security Council resolution 757 (1992) concerning the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

The Government of Ecuador has instructed all branches of the administration to see to it that there is strict compliance with the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Moreover, with respect to paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 757 (1992), Ecuador decided to close its Embassy at Belgrade in June 1992.

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* Received by the Secretariat on 9 July 1992.

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General Assembly Security Council

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Item 14 of the preliminary list*
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly and of the Security Council a letter dated 2 July 1992 addressed to him by the Director General of the International Atmomic Energy Agency concerning his report to the Board of Governors of the Agency on non-compliance with safeguards obligations (see annex).

* A/47/50.

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ANNEX

Letter dated 2 July 1992 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General

On 29 April 1992, the authorities in Romania submitted a special report to the International Atomic Energy Agency requesting it to conduct a special inspection as a result of their discovery that, during the time of the former regime in Romania, laboratory-scale research studies on certain aspects of nuclear fuel reprocessing had been conducted without having been declared to the Agency.

In conformity with article XII.C of the Statute of the Agency, I reported to the Agency's Board of Governors at its 783rd meeting, on 17 June 1992, that the special inspection carried out by the Agency confirmed that such experiments had in fact taken place in December 1985 and had resulted in the separation of approximately 100 milligrams of plutonium. I reported further to the Board that, under the agreement concluded between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards (INFCIRC/180), this should have been reported to the Agency, and that, until the present Romanian Government on its own initiative did so, this had not been done.

The Board of Governors took note of my report of non-compliance. On the basis of the report, the Board indicated that it was satisfied that corrective action had been taken, and expressed its appreciation to the Romanian Government for having brought the matter to the attention of the Agency upon discovery of the non-compliance. The Board further decided that, in accordance with article XII.C of the Statute, which requires the Board of the Agency to report non-compliance with safeguards obligations to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, the matter be reported to the Council and the Assembly for information purposes. I should, therefore, be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Hans BLIX
Director General

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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 757 (1992), 758 (1992) and 761 (1992)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraphs 17 and 18 of its resolution 757 (1992), as well as to its resolutions 758 (1992) and 761 (1992). I have kept the Council informed, through oral statements and written communications on my behalf, of progress relating to the reopening of Sarajevo airport under the auspices of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The purpose of the present report is to provide a comprehensive review of developments in this regard following the adoption by the Security Council of the above resolutions. It contains information available to the Secretariat up to 1600 hours, New York time, on Thursday, 9 July 1992.

I. BACKGROUND

2. On 6 June 1992, I reported to the Security Council that, in partial fulfilment of its resolution 757 (1992), UNPROFOR had, on 5 June, negotiated an agreement for the handing over to it of Sarajevo airport so that it could be made available for humanitarian purposes (S/24075). By its resolution 758 (1992), adopted on 8 June 1992, the Council approved my report and, inter alia, authorized me to proceed to the first phase of a concept of operations developed by the Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, which envisaged implementation of the airport agreement in four phases.

3. Following intensive work by UNPROFOR to establish the modalities of implementation of the agreement, and a visit to Sarajevo by President Mitterrand of France on 28 June, I further reported on 29 June to the Council, which adopted its resolution 761 (1992) on that date. This resolution authorized me immediately to deploy additional elements of UNPROFOR to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with my report of 6 June. It also called upon all parties and others concerned to comply fully with the agreement of 5 June, and, in particular, to maintain an absolute and

unconditional cease-fire; and appealed to all sides to cooperate fully with UNPROFOR in the reopening of the airport, to exercise the utmost restraint, and not to seek any military advantage in this situation.

4. It will also be recalled that the Council, in resolution 757 (1992), had demanded that all parties and others concerned create immediately the necessary conditions for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport and respecting the agreements signed in Geneva on 22 May 1992. It also requested me to continue to use my good offices in order to achieve the objectives mentioned above, and invited me to keep under continuous review any further measures that might become necessary to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies. Resolution 758 (1992) endorsed these objectives, and resolution 761 (1992) additionally demanded that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agencies and organizations, and take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel. The Council stated that, in the absence of such cooperation, it did not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 5 JUNE AGREEMENT

A. The cease-fire

5. The 5 June airport agreement (S/24075, annex) reaffirmed, in article 1, the 1 June cease-fire in and around Sarajevo. The parties would provide liaison personnel to assist in its verification. In article 2, the parties agreed that (a) all anti-aircraft weapon systems would be withdrawn from positions from which they could engage the airport and its air approaches, and be placed under UNPROFOR supervision, and (b) all artillery, mortar, ground-to-ground missile systems and tanks within range of the airport would be concentrated in areas agreed by UNPROFOR and subject to UNPROFOR observation at the firing line. These measures were to be established prior to the opening of the airport. Article 9 of the agreement stated that, to ensure the safe movement of humanitarian aid and related personnel, security corridors between the airport and the city would be established and would function under UNPROFOR's control.

6. Despite the endeavours of UNPROFOR's Sector Commander, Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, a cease-fire in and around Sarajevo has not been fully established at any time. Artillery, mortar, tank and small-arms exchanges have taken place on each day since the United Nations flag was raised on 29 June and the airport was opened by the first flight carrying humanitarian aid. Nor has the concentration of weaponry under UNPROFOR observation, required by article 2 of the agreement, yet been completed to the Sector Commander's satisfaction. While humanitarian aid has been moved into the city by convoys of UNPROFOR and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), secure corridors have not yet been established through the cooperation of the parties.

7. On a number of occasions since 29 June, fighting in the adjacent areas has come very close to the airport itself, although installations, aircraft and personnel at the airport have not themselves been targeted. Such fighting has none the less, at times, been intense, and sniper fire has been directed at UNPROFOR vehicles, although UNHCR's aid vehicles have not been attacked.

B. Functioning of the airport

8. By 9 July at 2200 hours local time, more than 100 planes from 15 countries carrying over 1,000 metric tons of food and humanitarian aid had arrived at the airport. On some days, as many as 17 have landed; on one such date (5 July), 300 tons of aid were brought in and unloaded. Despite the availability of only manual ground-handling, 240 tons were that day moved to distribution points in the city, and many aircraft were able to depart within an hour of arrival. These high standards have been maintained despite the considerable constraints described in my letter of 1 July 1992 (S/24222), many of which persist.

9. There has been a gradual build-up of UNPROFOR personnel in the sector. The first group of 30 was deployed to the airport on 28 June. French troops began to arrive on 1 July and the Canadian battalion arrived from United Nations Protected Area Sector West on 2 July. By 3 July all available United Nations military observers (UNMOs) and troops were deployed at the airport, with the two sides, and at other locations in Sarajevo. The current strength (military, United Nations civilian police (UNCIVPOL) and civilians) in the sector is 1,104. As the Council is aware, the deployment of the Canadian battalion from Sector West is on a temporary basis only, pending the arrival around 20-25 July of battalions being contributed by Egypt, France and Ukraine, which would permit the return of the Canadian battalion to Croatia. Other support elements are being provided by the Netherlands and Norway.

10. I am particularly pleased to note that my request to Governments to facilitate UNHCR's coordination role in the airlift operation has now been fully met. UNHCR staff members at the airport are working with UNPROFOR in the control of relief flights. UNHCR then ensures the expeditious dispatch of relief items to Sarajevo and its environs. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Madame Sadako Ogata, visited Sarajevo on 8 July to review the relief operation.

III. OBSERVATIONS

11. General Nambiar visited the Sector on 5 July to inspect the UNPROFOR operation there and to call upon leaders of the opposing forces. He has reported to me that General MacKenzie and the various elements in Sarajevo under his leadership are doing a magnificent job under conditions of great difficulty and danger. Though living conditions are, at best, spartan, morale is high. It could scarcely have been anticipated, given the situation, that the operation would have opened so effectively.

12. However, as the operation has taken shape, it has become apparent that the initial estimates of the additions required to the strength of UNPROFOR, contained in paragraph 8 of my report of 6 June 1992 (S/24075), were inadequate. The planned deployment of three small battalions rather than one reinforced battalion, as originally envisaged, and the need for air traffic control and handling elements, an artillery-locating radar platoon, a helicopter unit, a signals platoon and a medical platoon have raised the total number of additional personnel required to some 1,600. I shall be grateful for the Council's approval of this revised figure. A revised estimate of financial implications is being issued as addendum 1 to the present report.

13. It must also be stated that, despite the so far encouraging start of the operation, the circumstances surrounding it remain worrisome, and the success of the operation continues to hang by a slender thread. As mentioned earlier, three of the basic conditions stipulated in the 5 June agreement have not been complied with by either side - a cease-fire; the complete concentration of heavy weaponry under UNPROFOR monitoring; and the establishment of security corridors. Several members of the UNPROFOR military component have been slightly wounded by gunfire, and one soldier lost part of a leg in a mine explosion on 9 July. Fighting has continued, with only temporary lulls, in Sarajevo and all around the airport itself. The military situation remains unstable as forces opposed to those of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) appear to be seeking to press home the strategic advantage resulting from the handing over of the airport to UNPROFOR. The SDS forces in turn continue to respond with heavy weaponry into populated areas of the city. Reports of a military advance by Croatian forces to the vicinity of Sarajevo have been received from several sources. However, UNPROFOR has no independent means of verifying such reports. UNPROFOR personnel have reported encountering a checkpoint manned by forces flying the Croatian national flag on the city's outskirts on the edge of the SDS-controlled suburb of Ilidza.

14. In this context of limited resources and minimal security, UNPROFOR has been unable at this time to respond positively to the many requests it has received for humanitarian evacuation. The situation prevailing at Sarajevo airport, on the outskirts and within the city is extremely precarious. Because of this, as well as the operational considerations of the relief operation, it has not been possible to entertain initiatives for the evacuation by air of cases of special humanitarian concern. None the less, options for the evacuation of critical medical cases are being reviewed. The feasibility of such options will be determined, inter alia, by the security threat to the intended beneficiaries. Should such evacuations be possible, they would be undertaken in close coordination between UNPROFOR and UNHCR, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, according to well-established and internationally recognized principles of international humanitarian law.

15. On 3 July, the Chairman of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington, visited Sarajevo and met with the President of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the leadership of the SDS. On 9 July he briefed members of the Security Council on the outcome of his visit. When General Nambiar, accompanied by UNPROFOR Director of Civil

Affairs, Mr. Cedric Thornberry, and by General MacKenzie, called upon President Izetbegovic on 5 July, the President, while calling for the implementation of the provisions of resolution 757 (1992) on the establishment of a security zone around Sarajevo, agreed that the basic conditions for implementing even the more limited airport agreement had not yet been fully satisfied. He emphasized that the people of Sarajevo were still being attacked and killed by the forces of the SDS, and that some means had to be found to end the onslaught. While he was in favour of demilitarizing the contested area of Dobrinja, adjacent to the airport, he felt that other SDS-held neighbourhoods should also be similarly demilitarized and placed under UNPROFOR control.

16. During a subsequent meeting with Dr. Karadzic and Professor Koljevic of the SDS and the Commander of the army of the so-called "Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina", General Mladic, the Force Commander was told that the Serb forces were trying to maintain a unilateral cease-fire, but that it was impossible not to respond to the worst provocations and attacks from the other side. Allegations were made of a large Croatian military intervention. The SDS leaders said that their handing over of the airport to UNPROFOR had not led to peace and negotiations on the overall crisis in the Republic. They stated that they were willing to negotiate without preconditions, face-to-face with the Presidency; but that the President had refused to do this and was seeking to obtain external military intervention by almost any means, and that any such intervention could be disastrous for all concerned. General Nambiar took note of these statements but stressed that the issues raised lay outside the mandate of UNPROFOR.

17. General Nambiar has informed me that he is greatly perturbed by the situation which now exists in Sarajevo, and by the many reports and indications of deteriorating conditions throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. (It will be recalled that UNPROFOR's presence in the country is limited to Sarajevo and Bihac.) The current success of the airport operation is an outstanding tribute to the determination and courage of all who are participating in it - the aircrews from donor countries who are flying aid to Sarajevo and the members of UNPROFOR and UNHCR who are ensuring its distribution. But their endeavours have not yet stimulated a corresponding initiative by the parties to seek a lasting peace based on a political settlement.

18. In conclusion, it is clear that despite an encouraging start, the Sarajevo airport operation is based upon foundations of the utmost fragility. The continuing military conflict in the area could at any moment encroach upon the airport and disrupt the arrival and distribution of relief goods. Meanwhile, the provision of humanitarian aid to the rest of the country is sparse, intermittent, and hazardous. While efforts continue to be made by humanitarian agencies to open up routes to other parts of the Republic, vast areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina remain in desperate need of assistance. Only urgent efforts by the international community to address the basic causes of the conflict, including negotiations with all the parties involved in it, can resolve what has emerged as one of the worst humanitarian emergencies of our time.

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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 757 (1992), 758 (1992) AND 761 (1992)

Addendum

1. In my report to the Security Council (S/24263), I recommended in paragraph 12 that the strength of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) be increased by some 1,600 personnel and indicated that the revised estimate of financial implications arising from this recommendation would be issued separately as an addendum.

2. An appropriation has been provided to UNPPOFOR by General Assembly resolution 46/233 of 19 March 1992 for the period ending mid-October 1992. Should the Security Council agree to the proposed increase in the strength of UNPROFOR, it is estimated that the revised cost of the enlargement, for a four-month period from mid-June to mid-October 1992, would amount to some $22.7 million instead of the $20.1 million indicated in the original estimate (S/24075/Add.1). Thereafter, it is estimated that the monthly cost relating to these activities would amount to approximately $3.8 million. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

3. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to enlarge the strength of UNPROFOR, that the additional cost relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the UNPROFOR Special Account.

Annex

Cost estimate for the enlargement of UNPROFOR

		Initial 4 months	Monthly thereafter
		(In thousands of United States dollars)	
1.	Military component		
	(a) Observers	1 462	221
	(b) Contingent	7 731	2 200
	(c) Deployment of contingent-owned equipment	4 500	-
2.	Police monitors	556	147
3.	Civilian staff costs a/	1 485	402
4	Premises, maintenance and construction	786	190
5.	Air operations	518	173
6.	Vehicle operations	2 841	298
7.	Communications	897	27
8.	Miscellaneous equipment	774	-
9.	Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs	1 160	143
	Total	22 710	3 801

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a/ Provides for 34 international staff and general temporary assistance for locally recruited staff as needed.

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LETTER DATED 11 JULY 1992 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CROATIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Only a day after the end of the Helsinki Summit from which (just like the Bosnian-Herzegovian delegation whom we saw off from Zagreb this morning) we returned full of hopes that the situation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina would improve, I am compelled to send out this dramatic appeal.

In spite of all efforts made by the international community, the Security Council's resolution, the Helsinki decisions, UNPROFOR mission, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has taken a dramatic turn for worse.

The Serbian aggressors have intensified their attacks at all positions of already existing confrontation (Sarajevo, Bosnian Posavina, Mostar, Dubrovnik, Slavonski Brod, Županja ...) and opened new front-lines (Goražde, Travnik, Bugojno, Jajce ...).

By taking advantage of the fact that the attention of the world is concentrated on Sarajevo and the attempts to open the humanitarian corridor and trying to forestall decisive actions by international forces, which will have to be taken sooner or later anyway, the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressors are intent on achieving two basic objectives as soon as possible and through a large-scale military operation:

(1) Rounding up the borders of the so-called Greater Serbia through destruction of all Moslem and Croatian entities in contact zones;

(2) Accomplishing complete ethnic cleansing of territories within the so-called Serbian Krainas.

In order to achieve the second objective, they are committing crimes unheard of since the Holocaust and the end of the World War II. On a massive scale Moslems and Croats are being executed and herded into prison camps, entire places razed to the ground, even graveyard destroyed (e.g. the area of Prijedor-Kozarac). The purpose of all this is obvious: to drive out the non-serbian population from this area for good.

The situation is particularly dramatic in the areas of Northern Bosnia (Posavina) where the Serbian atrocities have forced the majority Moslem population there into a panic flight to Croatia.

Only today more than 20,000 people have fled across the river Sava to Croatia to seek shelter in the area between Slavonski Brod and Županja. As the Sava bridges are demolished, people are using all kinds of means to run to safety and many of them (including women and children) are swimming across the river Sava, panic-stricken as they are.

The aforesaid is an eleventh-hour warning that unless an international military intervention is undertaken shortly, the consequences in terms of the extent of human tragedy, mostly affecting children, women and old people, will be immeasurable.

Croatia is doing its utmost to give every possible help to this vast number of expelled people, but utterly exhausted as it is as a result of the war and the hundreds of thousands of refugees in need of accommodation, clothes and food, it has found itself in a position where it will be forced to redirect the flow of refugees towards Western Europe.

Therefore, I appeal to you to do all you can to prevent the tragedy which is looming larger and larger every minute. We believe that the only thing left is to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council and to approve an international military action.

I would appreciate if you could distribute this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Prof. Zdenko ŠKRABALO, M.D., Ph.D.
Minister

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12 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 JULY 1992 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CROATIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, a letter of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this Statement as a document of the Security Council to all members of the Council.

(Signed) Prof. Zdenko SKRABALO, M.D. Ph.D.
Minister

Annex

Letter dated 12 July 1992 from the President of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council

Due to the most recent avalanche of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina that was set in motion on 11 July 1992, the Republic of Croatia is now facing insurmountable difficulties in its effort to provide shelter and food for these people. Only in the course of the last 24 hours over 20,700 refugees crossed the Croatian border. The extent to which these people are panic stricken is best illustrated by the fact that many of them (even women and children) swim across the Sava River seeking shelter on the Croatian side. The total number of refugees currently being provided for in the Republic of Croatia has surpassed 650,000. About 361,500 are from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Serbian and Montenegrin aggessors are taking advantage of the fact that the attention of the world public is centered on Sarajevo and are escalating their attacks in all other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in part of Croatia. The events taking place in the area along the Sava River are particularly dramatic; we are faced here by a massive exodus of the Moslem and Croatian population from Bosnia across the river, while Croatian towns (this applies especially to Slavonski Brod) are being destroyed with surface-to-surface missiles.

It is with great regret that we have to state that all efforts made so far by the international commnunity to halt the Serbian and Montenegrin aggression by political and economic means and bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis have remained fruitless.

We therefore believe that the only remanining solution lies in a rapid and energetic military intervention by international forces. Each day of delay means hundreds of new casualities (mostly civilians and children) and thousands of displaced persons driven from their homes. Each additional day of destruction and devastation diminishes our hopes and our belief in a lasting solution in this part of the world.

We therefore suggest that the Security Council meets immediately and approves a military intervention - the only way to give normal life a chance in this part of Europe.

Your personal support for our proposition would be deeply appreciated.

(Signed) Dr. Franjo TUDMAN
President

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LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you a letter, dated 11 July 1992, from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.

Due to the quickly changing nature of events in our country and the very poor communication links with Sarajevo, this letter is already in need of an update.

In view of this situation, I have been asked by the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to inform you of the most recent developments related to the appeal delivered by H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, which I will do in an attached letter.

May I ask for your kind assistance in that the President's letter and my update letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Annex I

Letter dated 11 July 1992 from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council

We are writing to you to ask you to urgently summon the Security Council session in order to send an ultimatum to Serbia and Montenegro to stop their criminal attack against the innocent citizens of Gorazde, which is unprecedented and represents the twilight of civilization.

As we write, this innocent population is dying and being killed in circumstances which are beyond comprehension.

Since 12 April Gorazde has been under total siege: 70,000 people exposed to the aggression of Serbia and Montenegro, without electricity, water, food or medicine, including 40,000 refugees, mainly women and children, from neighbouring towns of eastern Bosnia, and absolutely unprotected. This latest and most brutal attack by the aggressor began today, 11 July, in the early-morning hours. The aggressor is using aviation, two armoured brigades (more than 40 tanks), six artillery batteries, four multiple rocket-launchers, 40 lorry-loads of ammunition, and six divisions which are advancing on Gorazde from Serbia and Montenegro. Gorazde is not able to defend itself against such a force, and is threatened with complete destruction.

If this crime is not stopped within the next few hours, mass massacre of innocent civilians will occur, causing a serious loss of confidence in the ability of the international community to act accordingly.

(Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIC

Annex II

Letter dated 13 July 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to address you on behalf of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to inform you about the latest developments related to the issues addressed in the letter to you dated 11 July 1992 from our President, H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.

The barbaric attack on Gorazde continues with all the brutal intensity that the Belgrade regime can muster.

In addition to the original massive force originating from two Yugoslav bases, one in Serbia, and the other in Montenegro, the aggressor has been further reinforced from the same bases. Reports from the area indicate that the tank count has now almost doubled, with close to 100 tanks now committed to destroy Gorazde. Troop size has also been enlarged. Furthermore, Belgrade has already conducted several air raids against the city, the last being reported today.

Gorazde is by no means the only town suffering from escalating brutal aggression against our country and our civilian population.

Numerous towns along the lengthy border with Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro have come under attack from the Belgrade regime. Most of the troops, with the most sophisticated weapons, have come from Serbia and Montenegro. Many have come from areas controlled by the Belgrade regime in Croatia.

Gorazde, nevertheless, has the greatest potential to become a maelstrom of genocide and destruction, as it has now become home for thousands of children, women and elderly, already seeking refuge from "ethnic cleansing" in surrounding towns and villages.

In pursuing this brutal campaign, the Belgrade regime and its surrogates have targeted Gorazde, at this time, for several reasons:

1. Belgrade aspires to consolidate its hold on a broad corridor, running as an arc, from eastern to northern and western Bosnia and Herzegovina. This will connect not only all of the areas under Belgrade occupation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also occupied areas in Croatia.

2. Belgrade aspires to pre-empt any international relief efforts into other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially Gorazde, the last major town under Government control in this area, lest it might have to carry out its "ethnic cleansing" campaign under the watchful eye of the international community and media.

3. Belgrade saw an opportunity in lag time between the last meeting on Bosnia and Herzegovina in Helsinki and the ability of the same States to respond promptly and effectively to a new offensive over the weekend. This follows a pattern where the most brutal and naked aggression begins at the onset of a weekend, as Belgrade deems that it would be difficult for the Security Council to gather and mount a timely response.

In view of the situation in Gorazde and many more towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we humbly request that the Security Council take all steps necessary, including air power, to stop this "humanitarian nightmare" from deepening, by neutralizing the attacks on our population centres around Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially Gorazde, which are now being overshadowed by the valiant relief efforts in Sarajevo.

Furthermore, we humbly recommend that the Security Council moves to initiate relief flights to Tuzla, a city north of Sarajevo. The city's airport and environs are under Government control, and could be used as an efficient distribution point for delivery of relief to Gorazde and other desperate towns nearby.

May I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

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13 July 1992

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992, 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992, 760 (1992) of 18 June 1992, 761 (1992) of 29 June 1992 and 762 (1992) of 30 June 1992,

Noting with appreciation the further report of the Secretary-General (S/24263 and Add.1),

Disturbed by the continuing violation of the Sarajevo airport agreement of 5 June 1992, in which the parties agreed, inter alia:

- that all anti-aircraft weapon systems would be withdrawn from position from which they could engage the airport and its air approaches;

- that all artillery, mortar, ground to ground missile systems and tanks within the range of the airport would be concentrated in areas agreed by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and subject to UNPROFOR observation at the firing line;

- to establish security corridors between the airport and the city, under UNPROFOR's control, to ensure the safe movement of humanitarian aid and related personnel;

Deeply concerned about the safety of UNPROFOR personnel,

Cognizant of the magnificent work being done in Sarajevo by UNPROFOR and its leadership, despite the conditions of great difficulty and danger,

Aware of the enormous difficulties in the evacuation by air of cases of special humanitarian concern,

Deeply disturbed by the situation which now prevails in Sarajevo and by many reports and indications of deteriorating conditions throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Commending the determination and courage of all those who are participating in the humanitarian effort,

Deploring the continuation of the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is rendering difficult the provision of humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo and its environs, as well as in other areas of the Republic,

Noting that the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes constitutes a first step in establishing a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport,

Recalling the obligations under international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,

Stressing once again the imperative need to find an urgent negotiated political solution for the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 10 July 1992 (S/24263);

2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy immediately additional elements of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with paragraph 12 of his report dated 10 July 1992 (S/24263);

3. Reiterates its call on all parties and others concerned to comply fully with the agreement of 5 June 1992, and to cease immediately any hostile military activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

4. Commends the untiring efforts and the bravery of UNPROFOR for its role in securing humanitarian relief in Sarajevo and its environs;

5. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agencies to facilitate the evacuation by air of cases of special humanitarian concern;

6. Calls on all parties and others concerned to cooperate with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agencies to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina which remain in desperate need of assistance;

7. Reiterates its demand that all parties and others concerned take the necessary measures to secure the safety of UNPROFOR personnel;

8. Calls again on all parties concerned to resolve their differences through a negotiated political solution to the problems in the region and to that end to cooperate with the renewed efforts of the European Community and its member States,

with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), within the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia, and in particular to respond positively to the invitation of the Chairman of the Conference to talks on 15 July 1992;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep close contact with the developments within the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia and to assist in finding a negotiated political solution for the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

10. Reaffirms that all parties are bound to comply with the obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep under continuous review any further measure that may be required to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LITHUANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to convey to you the following note from my Government concerning Security Council resolution 757 (1992) on the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

(Signed) Anicetas SIMUTIS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Note verbale dated 3 July 1992 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania addressed to the Secretary-General

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to Security Council resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 has the honour to inform him that, following the adoption of resolution 757 (1992), on 4 June 1992 the Government of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a decision to cease the export of any products or commodities, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs notifed to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991), to any person or body - in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). These measures were made stricter later on, when, acting in compliance with resolution 757 (1992), the Government of the Republic of Lithuania adopted executive order No. 506, deciding:

- To ban the import into the territory of the Republic of Lithuania of commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

- To prevent activities by its nationals or in its territory that promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including in particular any transfer of funds to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the purpose of such activities or dealings;

- To ban the sale or supply by its nationals or from its territory of any commodities or products to any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), but not including supplies for essential humanitarian needs;

- To take measures not to make available to the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) any funds or any other economic or financial resources, except payments for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs;

- To deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, if it is destined to land in or has taken from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

- To prohibit the provision of engineering and maintenance servicing of aircraft registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the certification of airworthiness for such aircraft;

- To prevent the participation in any sporting events on its territory of persons representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and to suspend scientific, technical and cultural cooperation.

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13 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 8 JULY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Saint Kitts and Nevis to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the latter's note dated 3 June 1992, concerning the imposition of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

The Chargé d'affaires a.i. has the further honour to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the Government of Saint Kitts and Nevis does no trading or has no other form of economic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Hence, the Government of Saint Kitts and Nevis intends to comply fully with the provisions of Security Council resolution 757 (1992).

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13 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit enclosed herewith a letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, H.E. Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, addressed to the President of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Matjaz KOVACIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Letter dated 13 July 1992 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that the Republic of Slovenia has joined the initiative calling for an emergency session of the Security Council to contend with the aggression in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We are witnesses to a rapid deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; there are new casualties, towns and villages are being demolished, and there is a new exodus of refugees from that region.

All these events continue despite the efforts of the international community, and especially of the European Community, as well as those of the Security Council and the conclusions of the CSCE Summit in Helsinki.

The aggression still continues and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is becoming one of the most critical problems with which the European Community and the international community must contend.

We therefore consider it of utmost urgency that the Security Council discusses the present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and takes the necessary measures to put an end to the aggression, armed terror, so-called ethnic purification, and to ensure strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its recognized borders.

(Signed) Dr. Dimitrij RUPEL

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13 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3094th meeting, held on 13 July 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Cyprus":

"The Security Council recalls the oral report presented on 24 June 1992 on the Secretary-General's mission of good offices in Cyprus. It welcomes the separate meetings which the Secretary-General had with the leaders of the two communities from 18 to 23 June. It notes with satisfaction that the discussions focused on the issues of territorial adjustments and displaced persons and that the other six issues that make up the set of ideas on an overall framework agreement were also reviewed. It is unanimous in expressing its full support of the procedure adopted by the Secretary-General for implementing resolution 750 (1992).

"The Council reaffirms its endorsement of the set of ideas as an appropriate basis for reaching an overall framework agreement as mentioned in paragraph 4 of resolution 750 (1992).

"The Council notes with satisfaction the acceptance by the leaders of the two communities to resume on 15 July their meetings with the Secretary-General and to remain for such reasonable duration as may be necessary to complete the work.

"The Council considers that the forthcoming meetings represent a determining phase in the Secretary-General's effort and calls on both leaders to be ready to take the necessary decisions to reach agreement on each of the issues as dealt with in the set of ideas as an integrated whole on an overall framework agreement.

"The Council endorses the Secretary-General's intention to invite the two leaders to a joint meeting as soon as the proximity talks reveal that the two sides are within agreement range on the set of ideas; and,

subject to the successful completion of the work at the joint meeting, to convene an international high-level meeting to conclude the Overall Framework Agreement.

"The Council calls upon all concerned to fulfil their responsibilities and cooperate fully with the Secretary-General to ensure the success of these meetings.

"The Council reaffirms its decision to remain seized of the Cyprus question on an ongoing and direct basis in support of the effort to complete the set of ideas and to conclude an overall framework agreement.

"The Council requests that the Secretary-General provide it with an ongoing assessment of the progress being made at the meetings beginning on 15 July so as to enable the Council to determine, as the talks unfold, how it might best lend its full and direct support.

"The Council looks forward to receiving at the conclusion of these meetings a full report from the Secretary-General as requested in operative paragraph 10 of resolution 750 (1992)."

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LETTER DATED 12 JULY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF EGYPT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a letter addressed to you by Mr. Amre Moussa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in which Egypt requests the United Nations to undertake, as quickly as possible, all measures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Chapter VII, in order to put an end to the tragedy that has befallen the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the Belgrade Government's policy of forced emigration.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed Noman GALAL
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex

Letter dated 11 July 1992 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to my letter of 6 July 1992, circulated as a document of the Security Council (S/24242), concerning reports that the Belgrade Government is forcibly displacing the inhabitants of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from their territory to the borders of neighbouring States via Serbian territory, I should like to draw your attention to the note addressed to the President of the Security Council on 3 July 1992 by the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations, indicating that the Belgrade Government was subjecting the inhabitants of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a policy of forced emigration and compelling them to bear passports of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", a policy established unilaterally by the Government of Belgrade and not recognized by the international community.

The international community's silence with respect to the policy of forced emigration inflicted upon the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina encourages the Belgrade Government to persist in its policy of expelling the inhabitants of that new State. That is why the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt is requesting the United Nations and the Security Council to undertake, as quickly as possible, all measures provided for in various chapters of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Chapter VII, in order to put an end to the tragedy that has befallen the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which is a disgrace to the entire international community. Egypt also requests the imposition of an immediate cease-fire accompanied by the rapid withdrawal of Serbian forces and armed militias, as well as the guarantee that émigrés and expelled persons will be able to return to their homes in safety, and the effective and comprehensive launching of international operations.

The situation demands that the United Nations take rapid action to protect the Sarajevo airport so that humanitarian aid can continue to reach the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to ensure that peace-keeping forces are deployed along the frontier between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in order to prevent new acts of aggression and to put an end to efforts to expel the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina from their territory.

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt considers that the Belgrade Government bears full responsibility for all the acts of aggression perpetrated by its forces and by the militias that cooperate with them against the population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(Signed) Amre MOUSSA
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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13 July 1992
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LETTER DATED 12 JULY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of further violations of Iraqi airspace by United States aircraft for the purpose of observation and provocation during the period from 2 to 7 July 1992, as follows:

Date	Details
2 to 3 July 1992	22 sorties flown by 11 formations of 2 aircraft at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 1.5 to 6.5 kilometres. The flights were concentrated over Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Mosul and Tall Afar.
3 to 4 July 1992	17 sorties flown by 7 formations of 2 aircraft and 1 sortie by 3 aircraft at speeds ranging from 700 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 1.5 to 6.5 kilometres. The flights were concentrated over Zakho, Amadiyah, Mosul, Dohuk and Tall Afar.
6 to 7 July 1992	32 sorties flown by 15 formations of 2 aircraft and 2 individual sorties at speeds ranging from 700 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 5 to 9 kilometres. The flights were concentrated over Zakho, Amadiyah, Mosul, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Arbil, Dukan and Tall Afar.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our letter No. 1/7/201 dated 8 June 1992, I wish to transmit herewith a table showing the number of bombs, missiles and miscellaneous projectiles discovered and disposed of in the various parts of Iraq. They total 3,778 in all for the period from 1 June 1992 to 1 July 1992.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Table showing the bombs, missiles and miscellaneous projectiles disposed of by the disposal detachments of the civil defence administrations in all governorates for the period from 1 June 1992 to 1 July 1992

No.	Administration	Number of bombs, missiles and miscellaneous projectiles
1.	Baghdad	6
2.	Ninawa	17
3.	Basra	2 714
4.	Babil	2
5.	Najaf	5
6.	Karbala	17
7.	Anbar	30
8.	Maysan	5
9.	Salah al-Din	61
10.	Diyala	-
11.	Wasit	54
12.	Ta'mim	70
13.	Dhi Qar	71
14.	Qadisiyah	2
15.	Muthanna	724
	Total	3 778

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LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 12 July 1992 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 12 July 1992 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that we have been notified that the Boundary Demarcation Commission has decided to hold its sixth session at New York between 15 and 24 July 1992.

On this occasion, I should like to refer to the letter that I addressed to you on 21 May 1992 concerning the decisions adopted on 14 April 1992, at its fifth session, by the Commission you appointed on the matter of the boundary (S/24044, annex). In that letter, I set forth in detail the viewpoint of the Government of Iraq on this grave matter in view of its vital importance to the interests of Iraq and of other regions of the world that experience international disputes regarding boundaries. In that letter, I elucidated how the Security Council had, in an unprecedented manner, intruded the issue of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait into its resolution 687 (1991) by imposing on it a particular status, while it is universally accepted in law and in practice as they relate to international intercourse that boundary issues are left to agreement between States because this is the only basis capable of ensuring the principle of boundary stability. I also explained how certain very vital aspects of the arrangements that had been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to achieve the objective enjoined by the Security Council with regard to so-called boundary demarcation did not ensure justice and fairness by striking a balance between the positions of the two parties and maintaining their equality. Those aspects included the way the Demarcation Commission was formed, the manner in which it undertook its technical work, the manner in which it took decisions, the nature and purport of those decisions and other important matters.

As you know, in my letter I addressed in detail one example of the manner in which the Commission reached a major decision on a matter of substance concerning the general course of the boundary line on the basis of a cartographic viewpoint that relied fundamentally on British correspondence and maps going back to the period when Britain was the colonial Power dominating the region. In this connection, I stated also how the Commission had adopted this approach as a general one and that, instead of exercising patience in reaching decisions and awaiting the presentation of the documents and notes referred to by the representative of Iraq, it prevented that from taking place by adopting substantive and technical decisions with notable haste and dispatch under the influence of evident pressure from the representative of the regime of Kuwait. The decisions were the outcome of answers to leading questions addressed to the two experts which led to proposals merely for the answer elicited without regard for the proper logic of the rules of procedure and the interrelated character of the substance of the issues addressed. The Commission thus ended up adopting decisions that were one-sided in respect of source and content.

As you know, I called attention to the fact that the Commission had accorded the representative of the regime of Kuwait the opportunity to raise the question of the demarcation of the maritime boundary in the Khor Abdullah despite the fact that the Commission's mandate did not extend to that matter, in the view of the two independent experts as supported by the Chairman of the Commission, in an obvious endeavour to secure the desires of the rulers of Kuwait at the expense of the historic rights of Iraq and its vital navigational interests.

I also made it clear to you that the actual reality of the work of the Commission in the field is unequivocal testimony to the fact that a fundamental decision of the Commission was implemented in a manner incompatible with its own tenor by the representative of the regime of Kuwait and his experts participating in the work on the ground and that the work of the Commission has not been safe from direct intervention by the Secretariat. Thus, the final outcome of all this activity is the essential fact that the matter of dealing with boundaries was justified and set in motion in accordance with a predetermined course so as to culminate in decisions imposed on Iraq without any regard for its interests and all the evidence that supports them and leaving no scope for justice and fairness to Iraq's territorial interests.

We still believe, as I indicated in my letter, that the outcome of the Commission's work is a purely political decision imposed by the Powers that today control the Security Council and the United Nations, in particular the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. The political objective of this decision is clear, and it is not only to deprive Iraq of its rights and damage its vital interests but also deliberately to create a situation of instability in the region in order to justify the continued presence of American and British armed forces and military bases so that they may continue to blackmail the existing regimes and to plunder oil resources.

After prolonged study of all the factors and circumstances, it is clear to us that the views of Iraq will not be heard in the Commission and that it will not provide an opportunity for a hearing regardless of any efforts we make to create an objective and impartial atmosphere for its work. This is because a prior and biased decision has been taken to harm Iraq's interests and deny its historic rights on the part of those countries that planned the Commission's work. Among the most salient facts that confirm this conclusion is that the Security Council was informed of the letter which we addressed to you and, instead of its tenor providing an incentive to careful consideration and fair investigation, the countries to which we have referred resorted to inducing the Council to adopt a statement by its President which contained only interpretations lacking in objectivity and threats.

For the reasons set forth above, we feel that our participation in the meeting of the Commission would be to no avail.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

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13 July 1992
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LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit herewith a letter dated 11 July 1992 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the continuation of the economic embargo against Iraq despite its compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

I should be grateful if you would kindly have this and the attached letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 11 July 1992 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

On 2 August 1992 the Security Council was seized with what is referred to as the question of the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. Since that time the Council has issued a number of resolutions imposing on Iraq a set of obligations from which there arises between the Council and Iraq a specific relationship, presumably governed by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

After this lengthy period, it is time to establish certain facts, in particular those which are not subject to any interpretation, including the following:

I. The Charter of the United Nations, like any charter by which independent, fully sovereign States are bound, is two-sided, involving both rights and obligations. The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations are, or are deemed to be, balanced in this respect; consequently, when the Security Council demands on the part of any State the performance of its obligations with respect to the Council, the Council has the obligation to uphold the rights of that State.

It is obvious, as far as the relationship between the Security Council and Iraq is concerned, that, leaving aside the question of the extent to which the Security Council resolutions are in keeping with the articles of the Charter of the United Nations - a matter dealt with in our numerous notes to the Secretary-General of the United Nations - Iraq undertook to comply with those resolutions when they were imposed upon it and has in fact complied with them in the manner stated to the Security Council in our letter to you dated 23 January 1992 and on the occasion of the visit of the Iraqi delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to New York in March 1992. Furthermore, Iraq, through the Deputy Prime Minister, has given assurance of its willingness to cooperate earnestly and constructively with the Security Council and the bodies representing it in proceeding with execution.

Some of the most important things achieved pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) are:

(1) All weapons in Iraq's possession which are prohibited under resolution 687 (1991), namely missiles with a range greater than 160 kilometres and stocks of chemical weapons, have been destroyed;

(2) Facilities and equipment connected with the production of long-range missiles and those connected with the use of chemical weapons have been destroyed;

(3) Iraq has not produced any bacteriological (biological) weapons, a fact which has been established by scientific and technical means;

furthermore, equipment which might be said to have the capacity to produce such weapons has been destroyed;

(4) Facilities and equipment connected with Iraq's nuclear programme concerning which there have been doubts and suspicions have been destroyed;

(5) The competent Iraqi authorities have furnished most of the information requested by the inspection teams and answered thousands of questions posed by them.

The information concerning which there is still disagreement relates to the request of the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency to be provided with the names of the foreign companies from which Iraq purchased some of the facilities and equipment for its arms programme and the names of persons of other countries who cooperated with Iraq in that programme.

Iraq has declined to reveal that information on moral grounds and will not step back from that position.

Disclosing the names of foreign companies and persons who cooperated with Iraq would expose many of them to the danger of liquidation by Israeli intelligence, as has happened in the case of some, such as Dr. Bull.

In view of these facts, whoever demands that Iraq should fulfil its obligations or fulfil the obligations imposed on it ought, more than anyone else and for obvious reasons, avidly to defend Iraq's rights under the Charter of the United Nations. The failure of the Security Council to respect that balance upsets the legal basis on which the Security Council founded the resolutions with which Iraq and others are being asked to comply. Therefore, no State is fully convinced regarding the continued performance of any obligation by it in respect of the resolutions of the Security Council. Thus, States bound by a relationship with the Security Council, such as Iraq, will proceed from what is possible and not possible, on the basis of capability and opportunity, in respect of the obligations imposed upon it by the Security Council, not on the basis of the covenants governing the relationship between the Council and States. The ground for this is that the Council itself has violated the legal basis and resorted to a basis of the possible and the impossible, particularly in its insistence on threatening to use force in lieu of a policy of mutual understanding based on the Charter of the United Nations and on depriving the people of Iraq of their most elementary human rights, as provided by the Charter.

II. In order to arrive at a firm conviction, let us turn to the charges levelled by some States members of the Council which wish to make it appear that Iraq's compliance with the resolutions is not complete and which make this charge a pretext for the continuation of the embargo against Iraq. We say that no one can deny the obligations discharged so far by Iraq. Accordingly, the maintenance of the embargo against Iraq up to the present time means that no level of implementation will alter the reality of the embargo in the least. In other words, implementation and non-implementation

amount to the same thing. Can the Security Council convince the States of the world, including Iraq, after this experience that there is any inducement to implement the resolutions that it adopts?

III. The United Nations Charter stipulates that the right of every human being to a livelihood is guaranteed. This right has now become relative with regard to necessities. A human being is not like an animal, with a specific type and quantity of food sufficing for a livelihood. It is self-evident that the Charter holds all men equal, regardless of the nationality they hold and the State to which they belong. Other rights therefore derive inevitably from this, so that man may live a life that realizes the human essence of the United Nations Charter. These include the level of cleanliness and the type of water he uses in his daily life, the standard of health that he should enjoy and other essential needs. In this regard, it is that the reference point for the realization of these essential needs is the level of the needs of human beings in the developed countries.

After the embargo imposed on Iraq since 6 August 1990 had remained as it was, unchanged from the initial format, in spite of Kuwait's return to the state desired by those who so zealously promoted the Security Council resolutions, and because Iraq's assets had in practice not yet been liberated, owing to the position of the States with which they were deposited, and for other reasons, the idea arose, last year, 1991, of exporting a quantity of Iraqi oil over a period of six months for the purchase of medicines and food for the people of Iraq. Although that goal is very modest by comparison not only with Iraq's actual requirements in all areas but also by comparison with the urgent humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq that must be met to ensure a minimum of humanity in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the idea evolved into two resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII, namely, 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which contain many political and practical conditions and restrictions that seek to strip the people of Iraq of the sovereignty which it won long ago and has maintained up to the present and in defence of which it has resisted colonialist and neocolonialist alike. Recently, the issue has developed into controversy, negotiations and pressures that have lasted for nearly a year. Here we find ourselves in the second half of 1992, and the urgent essential needs of the people of Iraq have not been met for the second half of 1991. The course of the negotiations that took place with the representatives of the United Nations Secretariat between January and June 1992 has led us to the conclusion, based on facts and information, that the purpose of the formula that some wish to impose on Iraq is not a humanitarian purpose involving the provision of a portion of the urgent humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq. The purpose is not the implementation of the United Nations Charter in this matter, but impairment of the independence of Iraq, intervention in its internal affairs and control over its future, in accordance with the unlawful wishes of certain influential States in the Security Council.

The most recent formula, presented to us after three rounds of negotiations between representatives of the United Nations and representatives of Iraq, contains a very long series of restrictions and complexities which

make it doubtful that the people of Iraq will benefit from the revenues from the quantity of petroleum exported over six months for the purchase of food and medicine. The numerous restrictions and complexities included in that formula expose the purchase, shipment and distribution of food and medicine to a great many possibilities for their hindrance or stoppage, to say nothing of the high prices that will be imposed on Iraq by suppliers, because of the complexities involved and the possible suspension of contracts and interference with them, and will reduce the actual purchasing value of the already paltry sum that will theoretically be made available to Iraq through this outlandish procedure.

Any step in the procedure in question, however small, is controlled by the supervision and power of acceptance or rejection of a number of parties (the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council, the observer at the port from which petroleum is exported, the inspectors monitoring goods at the port of loading and the point of entry to Iraq and the observers that the United Nations wishes to impose inside Iraq), and there are, in addition, the banking complexities that the formula contains. In fact, the only thing in the procedure that is guaranteed is the deduction of amounts from Iraq for the payment of so-called compensation and expenditure on United Nations activities which come to more than 30 per cent of the amount realized from the sale of the petroleum.

Having studied the question in a fully responsible manner, we therefore feel that the people of Iraq will obtain none of its urgent humanitarian needs through a procedure that will, in reality, be an operation to delude world public opinion that the embargo against Iraq has been eased although this is not so. Accordingly, the sound and workable course and one that will eliminate all suspicions and doubts and answer the entitlement to treatment in accordance with the standards of all humanitarian instruments, including the Charter of the United Nations, is for the Security Council to allow Iraq to export its petroleum in a normal and regular manner, just as it did before the events of August 1990, so that its people may have its humanitarian due. If the United Nations wishes to deduct a certain percentage, such as that imposed by the Security Council in its resolutions, an understanding can be reached thereon in an uncomplicated manner. If the Council finds it necessary to withhold any item from Iraq for any reason, it can oblige the countries of the world to observe such a prohibition, if indeed this is the intention and there is no other, different, intention. Further, Iraq is prepared, as it has already stated, to restrict its sales and purchases, for a particular period of time to be agreed upon, to the countries that are now members of the Security Council and with most of which Iraq had commercial dealings before the imposition of the embargo. These will be the countries participating in the adoption of resolutions and the monitoring of their implementation in order to ensure the propriety of the commercial transactions to be conducted by Iraq in accordance with commercial principles.

IV. It is clear and well established that in its resolutions the Security Council used the issue of Kuwait as a basis, or thus it declared to world public opinion. Among its resolutions are those on the embargo against Iraq.

It is also established that, in accordance with the foregoing, Iraq has met its obligations towards the resolutions of the Security Council, as we have indicated. Regardless of anything else, it is an established fact that Kuwait has been restored to the situation desired by influential parties in the Security Council. The maintenance of the embargo against Iraq has therefore lost its meaning, and it is henceforth no more than a simple matter of inflicting harm on a great, proud and noble people. There is no provision for such an act, either explicitly or implicitly, in the Charter of the United Nations or the resolutions of the Security Council, and, as we have said in section I above, its continuation destroys the legal basis of the Security Council resolutions and accords Iraq, if it should wish, the right to act towards those resolutions on a basis of ability and opportunity and not on the basis of a persuasive legal obligation. We are therefore of the view that the Security Council should terminate the effect of all of its resolutions against Iraq that were brought into being by previous circumstances, including the embargo resolution, and that matters should be restored to their situation prior to the events of August 1990. To maintain that the retention of the embargo would achieve any of the declared objectives of the Security Council, would plunge the Council into a paradox of a kind that would at the very least be an embarrassment to it. In the past, those who are influential in the Council persuaded those whom they persuaded by saying that nothing would be of avail in ensuring the implementation of the Council's resolutions other than the use of military force against Iraq. Those who used military force then used it on the night of 16-17 January 1991, and this continued until those who led the campaign ceased firing. If, then, an embargo is the means by which the Security Council seeks to achieve its objectives, why did it inflict on the international community all that it inflicted on it and why did it subject the people of Iraq to its plight of aggression and suffering?

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

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Security Council

Distr.
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S/24277
13 July 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our letters, the most recent being No. 1/10/234, dated 8 July 1992, I wish to inform you that United States aircraft conducted flights at 1330 hours on 8 July 1992 over the sugar refinery reconstruction project in Ninawa Governorate and that one of the aircraft dropped a fireball near the project and along the area's southern enclosure.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq, in drawing your attention to this hostile activity, protests these barefaced acts of aggression against the security of Iraq and the safety of its citizens and enterprises, for the consequences of which the American side is responsible.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/24278
14 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ESTONIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit a note verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia dated 2 July 1992.

(Signed) Ernst JAAKSON
Ambassador

92-31635 3277f (E) 160792

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Annex

Note verbale dated 2 July 1992 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia addressed to the Secretary-General

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia to the United Nations has the honour to inform the Secretary-General of the following with respect to paragraphs 4 to 9 of Security Council resolution 757 (1992):

The Governmental Decree No. 42 of 29 June 1992 established that "the competent authorities shall take appropriate measures to ensure the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992", prohibiting "the carrying out, within the framework of national jurisdiction, of the activities referred to in the resolution in question during the period in which it is in effect".

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14 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the letter dated 13 July 1992 from His Excellency, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to you.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter published as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Letter dated 13 July 1992 from the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council

With respect to the completely unfounded allegations contained in the letters of the President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, and the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegoviç, dated 12 and 13 July 1992 respectively, I wish to point out the following:

1. The Yugoslav Army has not undertaken action in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as alleged in those letters.

2. No plane belonging to the Air Force of the Yugoslav Army has taken off, let alone engaged in combat action, of which we are being accused.

With a view to precluding future wanton accusations, I invite the Security Council to send United Nations observers to the Yugoslav airports, in order to satisfy them that our Air Force has not been doing what it has been accused of so many times.

Since 19 May 1992, not a single combat plane or helicopter of the Yugoslav Air Force has flown over the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia.

3. The Yugoslav Army does not possess land-to-land missiles.

4. I do not understand the failure to see that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an interethnic, religious and civil war. This is not a war of one nation and one religion that could be stopped by the will of one warring party. Its end does not depend on the good will of Serbia and Montenegro. That war can be ended only by the will of all the three warring parties. Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be achieved unless it is made contingent on political solutions, ethnic cantonization and full national and civil equality, both in the confederate State structure, as well as within the territorial bounds of national communities with one basic principle: under no condition should ethnically pure communities be the objective. Every man in his right mind is appalled by the present ethnic cleansing being pursued by all the participants in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5. The military armament of the Yugoslav People's Army did not remain only in the hands of the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The following also remained with the Muslim-Croatian coalition: 231 tanks, 300 different calibre guns, 27 "Kol" type multiple rocket launchers, 60 "Oganj" type multiple rocket launchers, about 5,000 large calibre mortars, 100,000 automatic and semi-automatic rifles, 100,000 M48 rifles, 5,000 sniper rifles and 15,000 automatic rifles and machine-guns and a substantial quantity of infantry and artillery ammunition. Furthermore, 11 war matériel and ammunition factories - among them also a multiple launchers and rockets plant

currently operating at full capacity - have also remained in the territory of the Muslim-Croat coalition.

6. The persistent ignoring of the fact that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia are participating in the armed conflicts and that for weeks now they have been on the offensive in Bosnia-Herzegovina is astonishing.

7. I declare with full responsibility that there isn't a single soldier or officer of the Yugoslav Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Army of Yugoslavia is not providing any assistance in armaments and military equipment to the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina other than humanitarian aid and even that is limited in scope. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has no part in commanding the Serbian army in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mr. President, would you please see that this letter is distributed as a document of the Security Council.

Dobrica COSIC
President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia